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1. Introduction 
Agriculture in Europe has been affected by multiple drivers of change since the Second 
World War, including a post-war political drive for agricultural intensification to ensure 
food security, demographic changes through urbanisation and rural-urban migration, 
improvements in technology and economic processes resulting in a cost-price squeeze 
on agricultural production (van Vliet et al., 2015).  This process has led to a broadly 
similar aggregate response to agricultural production across Europe; intensification of 
the most productive land and extensification (and in some cases abandonment) of the 
least productive land (van Vliet et al., 2015).  These changes in agricultural management 
practices have created agricultural systems that are successfully leading to increased 
productivity, with farms that are larger, more specialised in production and working with 
a reduced labour force, but often at the expense of the environment (Plieninger et al., 
2016). As is well documented, some of these modern agricultural practices have 
resulted in considerable environmental and health costs (Pretty et al., 2000). 
 
The policy response to this impact of agriculture on the environment has been to 
increase beneficial environmental management through three distinct mechanisms. One 
mechanism is regulation, which has been used to enhance environmental behaviour to 
protect the environment.  A second mechanism is agri-environment schemes (AES), 
whereby farmers are paid for voluntarily undertaking specified environmental actions. 
This activity is referred to later in the paper as subsidised environmental activity. A third 
mechanism is the use of social approaches, whereby farmers are encouraged to 
undertake environmental management activities without financial reward or coercion, 
referred to in this paper as unsubsidised environmental activity.  
 
Interest in promoting unsubsidised environmental activity has ebbed and flowed in 
recent decades. Agricultural producer groups have promoted industry-led agri-
environment initiatives in an attempt to dissuade the Government from implementing 
environmental regulation in the face of growing public pressure over environmentally 
damaging agriculture practices (Cox et al., 1985; Cox et al., 1986; Clark and Jones, 
1998). This approach also resonates with the neo-liberal interest in shifting responsibility 
away from government with a greater emphasis on civic responsibility, giving rise to 
‘social approaches’ (Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011; Potter and Tilzey, 2005).  
Furthermore, there has been increasing Government support for industry-led 
partnerships in England, such as the Campaign for the Farmed Environment (CFE). The 
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CFE is a partnership of agricultural industry and environmental organisations that aims 
to maintain and improve the environmental condition of agricultural habitats and 
landscapes by working with farmers and advisers to embed environmental management 
as a core principle of all farm businesses for which they receive no financial reward 
(Clothier and Pike, 2013). The CFE was also promoted as a means of combatting the 
threat of further regulation of management practices on arable land through the 
introduction of compulsory set-a-side (Tasker, 2009). However, to date, there is a 
paucity of research on the use of non-monetary voluntary approaches to achieve nature 
conservation benefits (Santangeli and Laaksonen, 2015). Little is currently known about 
the amount of unsubsidised environmental activity occurring across the farming 
community and we present some empirical evidence identifying the extent of this activity 
amongst English farmers and compare some of its characteristics with subsidised 
environmental activity 
 
There is a distinct body of research that has explored farmers’ motivations for 
undertaking various environmental activities, by which we mean the reasons or driving 
force behind a particular behaviour.   
 
This work has looked at farmers’ motivations for complying with regulations (Winter and 
May, 2001) and the extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for undertaking subsidised 
activities through AES (Home et al., 2014; Van Herzele et al., 2013).  Recent work has 
also found that intrinsic motivations related to the concepts of self-identity and personal 
norms were important in influencing the intention to undertake unsubsidised 
conservation activities (Lokhorst et al., 2011; van Dijk et al., 2016). However, little else is 
known about the motivations for unsubsidised agri-environmental behaviour and 
particularly with respect to specific environmental management practices. As 
environmental practices that are undertaken voluntarily, without coercion or incentives, 
have a greater potential for sustained and durable benefits (Mills et al., 2016), we 
believe that this type of activity, in particular, requires more attention. 
 
Given the limited understanding of unsubsidised environmental activity on farms, the aim 
of this paper is three-fold. Firstly, to consider the extent to which subsidised and 
unsubsidised environmental activity is undertaken, focusing particularly on arable land. 
Secondly, to describe and compare farmers’ motivations for undertaking subsidised and 
unsubsidised environmental activity; and thirdly to understand the interaction between 
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these types of activity at the farm scale. The proposition is that by having a better 
understanding of these motivations it may be possible to achieve greater engagement in 
environmental activity amongst the farming community and to design advice, information 
and message framing that responds to and supports farmers’ main drivers for 
undertaking unsubsidised environmental management activity.  
 
In the next section we discuss different policy approaches to influencing environmental 
behaviour change and how an understanding of motivations can help with message 
framing to encourage voluntary environmental behaviour. In section 3 we describe our 
methodology and in section 4 we present new empirical findings on the pattern of uptake 
of subsidised and unsubsidised environmental activity in England and provide insights 
into the motivations that lead to voluntary environmental behaviours in farmers.  In 
section 5 we discuss the implications of our findings for message framing and 
engagement strategies.  
 
2.   Policy approaches to environmental behaviour change 
As previously mentioned, there are a number of policy approaches that can be used to 
change environmental behaviour on agricultural land, including regulations, economic 
incentives and social/voluntary approaches (OECD, 2001), although in practice, many 
policies use levers that fall into more than one of these categories. 
Regulations aim to change behaviour by requiring certain management practices or 
placing particular legal obligations upon managers of rural land.  For example, the 
establishment of Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZs) under the European Union (EU) 
Nitrates Directive areas in which farmers’ nitrogen fertiliser practices are restricted.  It 
has been argued that regulation – i.e. prohibiting actions that are deemed unacceptable 
– should form a ‘baseline’ level of behaviour or a ‘reference level’ which it is assumed 
that society wishes all land managers to observe in carrying out their activities (Fuentes, 
2004; OECD, 2001).  Regulatory approaches seem to work best in situations where the 
target group is already, or can relatively quickly be, persuaded that the regulated actions 
clearly fall below an acceptable ‘reference level’ of responsible farming practice (OECD, 
2001). It is hoped that through regulatory approaches an enforced change in behaviour 
will ultimately lead to a change in attitude towards environmental practices (Davies and 
Hodge, 2006), although evidence of such positive behavioural change is limited unless 
combined with other approaches (Barnes et al., 2013).  For example, Riley (2016) 
identified that only when closer environmental regulations were combined with longer-
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term AES participation were AES activities considered by the farming community as 
‘good farming’ practices. In fact, there is increasing recognition that command and 
control regulatory approaches are often overly bureaucratic and expensive (in terms of 
monitoring and enforcing compliance). Also it has been argued that formal legal 
approaches to environmental management de-motivates the individuals concerned, 
discouraging them to take an active approach to environmental stewardship and deliver 
sustainable, long-term benefits (Koontz, 2003; Spash and Biel, 2002).   
The rationale of applying and implementing economic compensation in agri-environment 
policy and schemes is based on market failure to deliver the socially desirable level of 
environmental quality (Pearce and Turner, 1990). The evidence suggests that these 
economic incentives are an important factor to increase farmers’ explicit participation in 
environmental management, in particular if payments and schemes are tailored to local 
natural and agronomic conditions (Bräuer et al., 2006). However, whilst some evidence 
suggests that AES can deliver durable changes in farmers’ attitudes and behaviour 
(Crabtree et al., 1999; Darragh and Emery, 2017; Fish et al., 2003), others argue that 
AES have not resulted in a broad pro-environmental behavioural change amongst 
European farmers (Burton et al., 2008; Van Herzele et al., 2013). Some would argue 
further that AES have created complacency with farmers only adopting agri-
environmental options that require no or minimal effort (Hodge and Reader, 2010; 
Schmitzberger et al., 2005; Wilson and Hart, 2000) and viewing environmental 
management as a public good for which they should be paid to deliver (Hodge and 
Reader, 2010). Several observers also suggest that the payment of subsidies for agri-
environmental contracts might discourage innovation and long-term commitment, as 
farmers are not rewarded for doing any more than the minimum required to receive 
payments (Burton et al., 2008; Deuffic and Candau, 2006; Kaljonen, 2006). 
Therefore, in the UK, there is increasing interest in the use of social/voluntary 
approaches to encourage behavioural change. It is suggested that shifting farmers’ 
extrinsic motivations for undertaking environmental management activities to more 
intrinsic ones is necessary to ensure sustained and widespread environmental 
improvements (de Snoo et al., 2013; Matzdorf and Lorenz, 2010; Van Herzele et al., 
2013; Wilson and Hart, 2001).  Furthermore, it is argued that if behaviour change leads 
to voluntary action then it tends to persist over time as it is more likely to become 
embedded in social norms (Ayer, 1997).    
 
2.1 Farmer motivations and message framing for environmental activities 
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There has been recognition of the importance of motivation, and especially the source of 
motivation, in attempting to explain farmers’ voluntary behaviour, such as their 
inclination to adopt conservation practices and participate in environmental schemes 
and practices (Black and Reeve, 1993; Home et al., 2014; Potter and Gasson, 1988; 
Smithers and Furman, 2003; Wilson and Hart, 2000; Wilson and Hart, 2001).   
The theoretical base for much of the work on individual motivation is derived from the 
field of psychology, education and employment research which distinguishes between 
different types of motivation based on the underlying attitudes and goals that give rise to 
an action and their intensity (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Gagné and Deci, 2005; Ryan and 
Deci, 2000). According to Ryan and Deci (2000 p.55 ) ‘The most basic distinction is 
between intrinsic motivation, which refers to doing something because it is inherently 
interesting or enjoyable, and extrinsic motivation, which refers to doing something 
because it leads to a separable outcome’.  An intrinsically motivated action is not reliant 
upon any outcome separable from the behaviour itself. For example, a farmer may 
undertake an environmental activity, such as planting trees, for no other reason than 
because it is innately satisfying. Conversely, extrinsic motivation is instrumental in 
nature and so is performed to attain some other outcome. For instance, a farmer might 
undertake environmental activity as part of an AES in order to receive a payment 
(Legault, 2016). 
Table 1 Motivations for undertaking environmental management 
Extrinsic motivations 
• Financial incentives 
• Profit maximisation 
• Security, long-term farm viability and/or risk minimisation, securing the family 
future and its continuity 
• Capital investment 
• Community image, standing within the community, respect amongst peers 
• Regulation (fear of penalty) 
• Recognition in wider society 
Intrinsic motivations 
• Personal sense of environmental responsibility and accountability 
• Commitment and interest in the environment 
• Personal sense of enjoyment 
• More durable than extrinsic 
Source Mills et al. (2013) 
Mills et al. (2013) have identified an array of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for 
undertaking environmental management (Table 1). It has been argued that the strength 
of and interplay between these motivations can have a profound effect on a farmers 
behaviour and environmental management, where actions taken as a result of intrinsic 
motivation may have greater longevity and permanence than some of the actions 
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motivated by extrinsic reasons (De Young, 1985). In addition, it has also been argued 
that some extrinsic motivations can undermine and suppress intrinsic motivations (Ryan 
and Deci, 2000) and can even lead to crowding out of intrinsic motivations (Greiner and 
Gregg, 2011). Although, others suggest that the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations is more complex and cannot be straightforwardly separated (Darragh and 
Emery, 2017)   
Within the research on motivations, the main interest has been on the balance or 
tensions between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations behind subsidised environmental 
activity. This paper differs by considering the balance between extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivations in unsubsidised environmental behaviours. 
Those who demonstrate extrinsic motivations respond to rewards. In the context of AES 
these can be direct rewards, in the form of payments to the farm business, either for 
investment or to enhance income, or indirect rewards through recognition from their 
peers and from society. Many studies emphasise the importance of financial incentives 
for participation in AES. Wilson and Hart (2000, 2001) noted in their extensive 
transnational study that most farmers surveyed were driven in their AES participation 
decisions primarily by perceived financial benefits, despite the fact that AES are 
designed to be income neutral. This mirrors findings from other national and 
international studies that have highlighted the financial imperative behind scheme 
participation in most EU AES (for example Brouwer and Lowe, 1998; Buller et al., 2000; 
Morris and Potter, 1995; Whitby, 1996; Wilson, 1996; Wilson and Hart, 2000).  
Intrinsic motivations are those which reside in the values, beliefs and environmental 
sympathies of the individual (Vinning et al., 1992) and are often reflected in a personal 
sense of environmental responsibility and accountability. Commitment to the natural 
environment and a personal interest in wildlife are clear intrinsic motives identified by a 
number of studies (Berentsen et al., 2007; Herzon and Mikk, 2007; Mills et al., 2016).  
Motivations often over-looked are those that relate to social and psychological factors. 
These may for example, relate to the impact on social status or reputational benefits, or 
even a sense of moral obligation (Borkey et al., 1999; Burton and Paragahawewa, 
2011).   
An understanding of farmers’ motivations to undertake voluntary environmental activities 
can help with the development of advice and information strategies for enhancing 
environmental management and in framing appropriate messages for the adoption of 
specific practices (Mills et al., 2016).  Research shows that the way in which a message 
is framed can affect the degree of persuasion elicited (Smith and Petty, 1996).  Frames 
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can be defined as interpretive structures through which individuals organise and make 
sense of an ambiguous stream of events in the world (Goffman, 1974). The framing 
literature distinguishes between information that focuses on the positive consequences 
of undertaking a particular behaviour (gain frame), and information on the negative 
consequences of not undertaking a particular behaviour (loss frame) (Spence and 
Pidgeon, 2010).  For example, advisory information could state that the establishment of 
field margins will increase the number of farmland birds (gain frame), or conversely, if 
field margins are not established then farmland bird numbers will continue to decline 
(loss frame). 
The idea of message framing is based on regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) which 
postulates that individuals have two distinct types of orientations in pursuit of their goals, 
the pursuit of positive outcomes (i.e. a promotion focus) or the avoidance of negative 
consequences (i.e. prevention focus), which impacts on message persuasiveness.   
Interestingly, research has also linked different goal pursuits to individual characteristics.  
Those individuals demonstrating a promotion focus in their goal pursuits tend to 
concentrate on needs that relate to hopes, accomplishment and progress (Higgins, 
1997). They also have an independent self-view with a focus on themselves (Aaker and 
Lee, 2001).  In contrast, those who exercise a prevention focus are concerned with 
safety, responsibility and security needs and tend to have an interdependent self-view 
(i.e., a focus on others) (Aaker and Lee, 2001; Higgins, 1997).  
The heterogeneity of farmer motivations and environmental behaviour is well 
documented (Dwyer et al., 2007; Mills et al., 2013).  Therefore it is inevitable that the 
impact of message persuasiveness to undertake unsubsidised environmental 
management will vary depending on the individual farmers’ underlying motivations.  This 
paper seeks to identify the motivations for undertaking specific environmental 
management activities, thereby providing evidence with which to develop engagement 
strategies and to frame messages to encourage more widespread unsubsidised uptake 
of environmental management practices. We argue that to achieve sustained and 
durable environmental management, the ultimate aim would be to frame messages that 
encourage a shift from extrinsic motivations towards more intrinsic ones that become 
embedded in the social norms of the farming community. 
Whilst studies have explored the extrinsic and intrinsic motivations for participation in 
AES, our review has found little research that has considered the motivations for 
undertaking unsubsidised environmental management on a voluntary basis.  The focus 
of this paper, therefore, is to identify amongst a group of English farmers the extent of 
unsubsidised environmental activities on mainly arable land, the motivations for 
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undertaking this unsubsidised activity and the interaction between the subsidised and 
unsubsidised environmental management practices.  
 
3.  Methods 
Three sources of data which provide insights into farmer motivations are used to 
address these foci/questions. Data are derived from a large face-to-face Government 
survey of 1,345 farmer businesses and from in-depth face-to-face interviews with 60 
farmers. Findings are also presented from an analysis of the national dataset of English 
AES (Entry Level Stewardship (ELS) and Higher Level Stewardship (HLS).  The 
research focuses particularly on arable farms because we were interested in the 
motivations of farmers who had joined CFE, which is the largest initiative promoting 
unsubsidised management ever undertaken in England and which at the time applied 
only to arable land. 
 
3.1 Analysis of Farm Business Survey 
The quantitative data presented in this paper are derived from the UK Government’s 
2008 Farm Business Survey (FBS) of England.  This survey provides a valuable dataset 
with which to examine the question of farmer motivations for undertaking subsidised and 
unsubsidised environmental activity.  It is a national face-to-face survey funded by the 
UK Government that provides information on the physical and economic performance of 
farm businesses. The survey represents all aspects of agriculture and covers all types of 
farms in all regions of the country. It includes owner-occupied, tenanted and mixed 
tenure farms. Results are weighted to represent the whole English population of farm 
businesses with at least the minimum size of ½ Standard Labour Requirement.   
The following analyses presented in this paper are based on a subset of the main 
sample that responded to a section on countryside maintenance and management in 
2008 and the results have been re-weighted to take account of non-response, so as to 
represent the overall FBS target population (Department for Environment Food and 
Rural Affairs, 2010). Only those farms in the FBS which were managing the land in a 
positive manner were eligible to complete the survey module (henceforth referred to as 
eligible farms). Positive management was defined as any land management measures 
or activities that deliver a positive environmental outcome as identified by the farmer.  
95% confidence intervals were calculated and are shown as error bars around the 
percentages presented in Figure 2.  
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The countryside maintenance and management module of the FBS questioned farmers 
about 27 types of environmental activity, all options with the English AES, Entry Level 
Stewardship.  The analyses presented here focus on 7 activities that relate specifically 
to arable production and had a sufficient number of responses to conduct significance 
tests1. These environmental activities, that may have been subsidised (occurring within 
an AES) or unsubsidised, are presented in Table 2 along with a description of the 
associated environmental benefits. 
 
Table 2 Description of environmental activities used in FBS survey 
Activity Description 
Field corner management Uncultivated corners of a field (often awkward or irregular in 
shape) providing potential foraging areas for birds and insects 
Wild bird /pollen and nectar 
mixture 
Strips of land sown for wild bird cover or wildflowers 
Buffer strips Areas of land maintained adjacent to watercourses in permanent 
vegetation that help to control soil and water quality 
Overwintered stubble Fields where the stubble of the harvested crop is left overwinter to 
provide food and winter refuge for wildlife. 
Uncropped land (excluding 
buffer strips) 
Arable land which is not used for growing crops, such as field 
margins, set-aside land 
Hedges: maintenance Hedges that are maintained for the environment through a cutting 
regime that provides food for birds 
Ditches: maintenance, 
restoration 
Ditches that are maintained or restored to benefit the 
environment, affecting floating and submerged aquatic species 
and riparian species on ditch banks. 
 
The FBS asked respondents to select from a list of 16 predetermined responses, the 
primary reason (or motivation) for undertaking each environmental activity. These 
responses were then grouped by the survey designers into 5 main motivations as 
presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 Grouping of motivations for undertaking environmental management 
activities 
 
General group FBS Questionnaire motivation 
Financial Maintain capital value of farm/appearance of farm 
 Contributes to overall business e.g. shooting, open farm 
 Financial benefits of scheme membership 
 Other Financial reasons 
Environmental Safeguarding environmental features for future generations 
                                               
1 The Chi-square test is used to determine if the differences between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations for undertaking subsidised and unsubsidised environmental activity are statistically 
significant (Figure 3). The significance level was set at P<0.5, indicating that is there is a 95% 
probability that differences are not due to chance.    
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 Interest in agri-environment management 
 Good for long term sustainability of the farm 
Agronomic Ground conditions/Wet Autumn 
 Stock keeping  
 Part of rotation 
 Provides a natural means of controlling pests 
Outside farmers control Cross compliance (regulation) 
 Feature has always been there 
 Landlord/owner likes it/condition of tenancy agreement 
 Legal Requirement (regulation) 
Other Other  
 
The FBS analysis enabled us to link the pattern of subsidised and unsubsidised 
environmental activity at a national scale with some broad categories of attributed 
motivation.  However, we recognise its limitations in providing only a limited range of 
mainly extrinsic motivations.  The analysis was therefore supplemented by in-depth 
face-to-face interviews which enabled a more nuanced approach allowing for a broader 
range of motivations, including social and psychological factors. 
3.2 Face-to-face interviews 
The qualitative analysis was based on in-depth, face-to-face interviews with 60 mixed or 
arable farmers. The interviewees were selected from a Government postal survey of 754 
farms in relation to the CFE and the interviews were held with the main decision-maker 
on environmental management on the farm. The selection covered each of the 8 regions 
in England, although as the study was focused on arable areas, a greater proportion of 
the interviews was undertaken in the predominantly arable regions of England (Eastern 
and East Midlands) than the pastoral areas of the country. The aim of the selection 
process was also to obtain a good coverage of the different combinations of subsidised 
and unsubsidised environmental management activity and farm sizes.  This analysis 
was valuable as it allowed a direct comparison of motivations between a group of 
farmers who were undertaking subsidised and unsubsidised environmental activity.  
The methodology for the in-depth farmer interviews was based on a semi-structured 
questionnaire incorporating a fairly open framework which allowed the interviewer to 
probe for details or discuss particular issues as they arose. The interview guide aimed to 
identify the farmers’ motivations or barriers to environmental management activities. 
Questions also focused on understanding the different contexts in which the farmers 
operated, the local conditions in which they made their decisions, and the role of farming 
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culture, focusing beyond the individual. The interviews took place at the farm, taking on 
average 1 hour to complete. 
3.3 Analysis of the national dataset of English AES  
Analysis of the agreement holder data was undertaken for AES operating in England, 
which provides some insights into the interaction between subsidised and unsubsidised 
environmental activity at the farm scale. At the time of the analysis in 2013 around 70% 
of all agricultural land in England was under an AES agreement.  The scheme was 
comprised of the Entry Level Stewardship (ELS) scheme, which was a basic fixed 
payment scheme based on points which related to the total area of agreement land2. 
The basic ELS could also be combined with a Higher Level Scheme (HLS), requiring 
more demanding options. 
 
4.   Results 
4.1 Comparing the extent of subsidised and unsubsidised environmental activity 
Analysis of the FBS data identified the proportion of respondents on eligible farms that 
were undertaking their environmental activities either as a subsidised AES, 
unsubsidised, or a combination of both. As Figure 1 shows, four out of five farmers 
(79%) were members of an AES, while two thirds (66%) undertook unsubsidised 
environmental management activities. The most common category was to undertake 
environmental management activity both as part of an AES and unsubsidised (45%).  
Figure 1 Percentage of farms by environmental management activity (n=1,345 ) 
 
                                               
2 points target = 30 points x hectares of agreement land 
Subsidised AES only
34%
Unsubsidised only
21%
Subsidised AES and 
unsubsidised
45%
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Analysis of the FBS data identified in more detail the extent of subsidised AES and 
unsubsidised environmental activity on English farms.  In Figure 2, the FBS data for 
eligible farms were analysed by the number of arable environmental management 
activities undertaken either within a subsidised AES or unsubsidised.  It is clear that the 
majority of environmental management activities take place within a subsidised AES 
(72%), although around a quarter of activity is unsubsidised (28%). 
Figure 2 also shows that when comparing the area or length of different arable 
environmental activities, a higher proportion of uncropped land is unsubsidised, than in a 
subsidised AES.  The other activities are more likely to be undertaken within a 
subsidised AES, particularly field corners, buffers strips and wild bird/pollen and nectar 
mixes. 
Figure 2 Environmental features undertaken by management grouping  
 
 
4.2 Motivations for undertaking subsidised and unsubsidised environmental 
activity 
The FBS data were analysed to identify motivations for undertaking environmental 
activities on mainly arable farms within subsidised AES and as unsubsidised activity 
(Figure 3). Respondents were mainly motivated to undertake all arable environmental 
activities within a subsidised AES for financial reasons.  Although AES are designed to 
0
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Environmental management activity
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be income neutral, farmers perceived benefits in terms of maintenance of capital values 
and contribution to the overall farm business. Those who were managing wild bird / 
pollen and nectar seed mixes were more likely to cite environmental motivations for 
doing this compared to the other activities.  Activities more likely to be motivated by 
agronomic reasons were overwintered stubble and uncropped land.  Ditch management 
and buffer strips were activities more likely to be undertaken for reasons outside the 
farmer’s control, which is likely to relate to regulatory requirements. 
Figure 3 (around here) 
The motivations for undertaking unsubsidised environmental activities are distinctly 
different to the motivations for undertaking subsidised AES activities. A striking 
difference in the responses is the extent to which agronomic and environmental 
motivations are of greater importance for unsubsidised activity. The agronomic reasons 
are particularly important for unsubsidised overwintered stubbles and uncropped land.  
Environmental reasons were given in particular for carrying out unsubsidised field corner 
management, and establishing wild bird/pollen and nectar seed mixes and buffer strips.  
Reasons ‘Outside of farmer’s control’ were also of importance, particularly relating to 
maintenance of ditches, hedges and buffer strips. This explanation is likely to relate to 
regulatory requirements, such Local Environmental Risk Assessment for Pesticides 
regulations (LERAPs), which stipulate pesticide spraying buffer zones near 
watercourses. 
Table 4 provides a breakdown of the motivations for undertaking unsubsidised 
environmental activity by specific reasons. 
Table 4 Primary motivations for undertaking unsubsidised environmental 
activities (%) 
General 
group 
FBS 
Questionnaire 
reason 
Ditches 
maintenanc
e, 
restoration 
n=129 
Hedges, 
maintenanc
e 
n=360 
Uncroppe
d land 
n=113 
Overwintere
d stubbles 
n=42 
Buffe
r 
strips 
n=51 
Wild 
bird/nectar 
pollen 
mixes 
n=40 
Field 
corner
s 
n=45 
Agronomic 
(extrinsic 
motivations) 
- Ground 
conditions/ 
Wet Autumn 
4.5 0 31 27 6.8 8.4 18.5 
  - Stock keeping  0.8 20.4   0 0 0 0 
  - Part of rotation 0 0.3 8.6 49.3 2 0 1.9 
  
- Provides a 
natural 
means of 
controlling 
pests 
0 0.3 0 0 0 0.8 0 
Financial 
(extrinsic 
motivations) 
- Maintain 
capital value/ 
appearance 
21.4 22.8 0 1.4 0 0 0 
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of farm  
  
- Contributes 
to overall 
business  
2.7 0.7 13.9 5.9 5.5 42.4 0.6 
 
- Other 
Financial 
reasons 
4.5 0 8.3 0.6 0 2.5 5.1 
Environment
al 
(intrinsic 
motivations) 
- 
Safeguarding 
environmenta
l features for 
future 
generations 
2.4 1.5 3.8 0 4 0 5.9 
  
- Interest in 
agri-
environment 
management 
8.9 8.8 10.2 3.3 34.7 28.4 37.4 
  
- Good for 
long term 
sustainability 
of the farm 
20.7 11.1 4.4 4.1 1.4 2.7 13.3 
Outside 
farmers 
control 
- Cross 
compliance 0 1.4 1.2 1.6 37 0 0 
  
- Feature has 
always been 
there 
30.3 24.9 7.9 0 0 0 7.9 
  
- Landlord/ 
owner likes 
it/condition of 
tenancy 
agreement 
0.9 4.2 0 0 0 3 0 
  - Legal Requirement 0 0.3 0 0 3.3 0 0 
Other - Other  2.9 3.3 10.7 6.8 5.3 11.8 9.4 
 
Through the 60 in-depth farmer interviews it was possible to further explain and show 
the relevance of the motivations for undertaking unsubsidised environmental activities 
described in the FBS survey. The next section illustrates show how the extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivations reveal themselves in practice by focusing on several specific 
features. 
4.2.1 Agronomic motivations (extrinsic)  
The survey analysis and interviews revealed that some activities identified by farmers as 
unsubsidised environmental management were in fact extrinsically motivated often 
arising as a result of agronomic convenience.  
One such example is the use of overwintered stubble, an important food source and 
refuge for wildlife. In the FBS survey, 76% of farmers stated that the main reason for 
establishing unsubsidised overwintered stubbles was for agronomic reasons. Of these, 
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49% stated that the reason was due to their rotation, whilst the other 27% reported that it 
was due to ground conditions/wet autumn.  For some farmers interviewed, whilst they 
recognised the environmental benefits of overwintered stubbles, they were extrinsically 
motivated to leave them agronomic reasons, because it fitted with their spring cropping 
rotation. Also areas of uncropped land were often left for agronomic reasons. For 
example, uncropped areas, such as grass margins around arable fields aided vehicular 
access across the farm. Areas were also left uncultivated due to the suboptimal 
condition of the land, or where the ground was too wet to cultivate in the autumn (31%) 
as illustrated by the following quote 
“Next to the woodland it is a very cold dank piece of ground, it never dries 
out and is fairly heavy ground you can do what you like to farm it but it 
never grows anything, so if it doesn’t grow anything what is the point?  We 
seeded it down and let it go au naturale”. (large sized, mixed farm). 
 
Clearly, this farmer was extrinsically motivated to leave the field margin uncultivated, but 
still viewed it as an environmental activity.   
4.2.2 Financial motivations (extrinsic)  
The survey and interviews also revealed that some unsubsidised activities provided 
financial benefits.  For example, around 45% of the FBS survey respondents were 
extrinsically motivated by financial reasons for establishing unsubsidised wild bird/pollen 
and nectar mixes, of which 40% claimed that the activity contributed to the overall farm 
business (Table 4). The farmer interviews revealed that financial considerations may 
arise from the establishment of these strips for game birds.  Many arable farms in 
England have pheasant or partridge game shoots for which wild bird strips have been 
established.  As some income is gained from these birds shoots there is a financial 
motivation for establishing such strips, although respondents were also convinced that 
these strips benefited wild birds on the farm, as the following quote illustrates.    
“We have a little shoot on the farm.  That is really good because we use 4 
or 5 different mixes in there. We have maize, fodder rape, red and white 
millet, they love that. All the little finches and little birds that feed in the 
garden all winter are down there as well. If you walk down there are 
hundreds of birds coming out of the game crop into the hedge”. (large 
sized, horticultural, tenanted farm) 
Interestingly, establishing game strips was one activity where farmers often took a 
holistic overview of the farm.  For example, one farmer referred to locating the game 
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strips to make wildlife corridors through the farm, others had established blocks of game 
cover strategically around the farm. Also several of those interviewed had enjoyed 
experimenting with different seed mixes in order to find food plants that would function 
most effectively on their farm. It appears that pleasure was derived from the experiential 
learning involved in establishing these strips. 
 
The interviews also revealed that the financial motivations for unsubsidised maintenance 
of ditches and hedges related to a desire to maintain the capital value and appearance 
of the farm.  The respondents were prepared to undertake these management practices 
without any financial compensation as they saw the economic benefits of keeping fields 
drained and hedges trimmed to allow vehicular access and protect livestock.  There may 
have also been an intrinsic motivation for maintaining these features related to aesthetic 
appeal and maintaining a sense of place for “features that have always been there.” 
 
4.2.3 Environmental motivations (intrinsic) 
An interest in the environment and wildlife provided a clear intrinsic motive for 
undertaking some unsubsidised activity.  For example, a high proportion of farmers 
(57%) in the FBS survey stated that the primary motivation for undertaking unsubsidised 
field corner management was for environmental reasons. With many of these (37%) 
stating an interest in agri-environment management as a reason.  The interviews 
revealed that field corners were often left by farmers to deliver environmental benefits. 
By leaving these small areas at the edges of productive land they felt they were making 
their contribution to the environment.  Field corners were favoured by farmers as they 
provided environmental benefits whilst fitting in well with existing farm management 
systems and having minimal impact on production. So whilst there were intrinsic 
motivations for establishing the unsubsidised field corners, the behaviour, as with the 
uncropped land above, was also influenced by extrinsic motivations, for example, 
leaving existing areas of unproductive land, or awkward corners that were difficult to 
cultivate, sometimes due to an obstacle, such as a tree, as the following quote 
illustrates. 
“One corner was taken out because there is an old oak tree in the corner 
and the sprayer won’t go between the oak tree so that is taken out.  
Another corner has been fenced with trees because it lies a little bit wet…. 
There are a lot of wildflowers, albeit a lot of the wildflowers are weeds!” 
(medium sized, mixed, owner occupied farm) 
18 
 
  
Unsubsidised buffer strips were also cited by 40% of farmers as being undertaken for 
environmental reasons. Although a similar number (40%) stated that they implemented 
buffer strips for regulatory reasons. The farmer interviews revealed that the participants 
particularly understood the rationale for buffer strips against watercourse in terms of 
preventing water pollution. One farmer, for example, talked about leaving a larger 
margin against watercourses than the cross compliance requirements, as he had 
attended a number of spraying courses and was ‘frightened’ of causing environmental 
pollution through spraying. He felt more comfortable knowing that had he had some 
leeway with the spraying because he had established the extra wide margins, as the 
following quote highlights. 
“With spraying you realise how many miles [of water course] that can 
contaminate, you start thinking, well for the sake of 6 meters of grass…” 
(medium sized, mixed, owner occupied farm) 
This farmer was clearly intrinsically motivated by a personal sense of environmental 
responsibility. 
The FBS survey also revealed that around 30% of farmers stated environmental 
motivations for establishing unsubsidised wild bird/pollen and nectar mixes. Whilst the 
previous section identified extrinsic motivations for establishing wild bird strips, the 
interviews also revealed intrinsic motivations stemming from a personal interest in 
wildlife. These farmers in particular tended to be more observant of changes in species 
occurrence and abundance on the farm, although they viewed wildlife from a fairly 
narrow perspective, focusing on the higher species and not the less conspicuous 
species which are not part of everyday life.  They were particularly keen on undertaking 
bird-friendly management activities and undertaking these unsubsidised activities 
reflected personal norms and contributed to self-esteem as the following quote 
illustrates. 
“It creates a bit of habitat and some seeds for the birds, creatures, or whatever over 
winter. And I feel good about myself when I do that sort of thing.” (small sized, dairy, 
owner occupied farm) 
The in-depth interviews also captured other motivations for undertaking unsubsidised 
environmental management that were not covered by the questioning in the FBS survey.  
For example, a number of farmers in the survey abutted nature reserves and this 
motivated them to do more for the environment.  This is illustrated by one farmer’s 
reason for placing a wide margin against a watercourse  
19 
 
“It is easier to have the margin because on the other side of the ditch the 
land belongs to an ecological trust and they have trees and fancy grass and 
bird boxes and all that and I thought it might look like I was doing my bit as 
well” (medium sized, tenanted, horticultural farm). 
They evidently felt under an obligation (or observation) to undertake environmental 
management practices, in part as it contributed positively to their community image. This 
is another example of an activity that is both intrinsically and extrinsically motivated. 
 
4.3 Unsubsidised environmental activity within AES  
 
Analysis of agri-environment scheme data for England reveals that a significant 
proportion of the subsidised agreements exceeded their required points. In other words, 
they were delivering more environmental activity than they were receiving payment for. 
In 2013 this resulted in over 24 million excess points in AES which is equivalent to £24m 
annual value of unsubsidised activity (see Table 5). On average there were 11.6% extra 
points in ELS agreements, with clear differences between ELS only and ELS-HLS 
variants. The stand-alone ELS agreement delivered more excess points, than those ELS 
agreements combined with HLS agreements. 
Table 5 Excess Points delivered by English AES 
 Total Excess Points Excess Points as % of Scheme 
Threshold 
ELS 16,401,015 13.7 
ELS/HLS 5,754,640 8.0 
Organic ELS 1,293,780 17.3 
Organic ELS/HLS 925,422 9.0 
Grand Total 24,374,857 11.6 
 
 
Looking in more detail at the subscription rates it can be seen from Figure 4 that 57% of 
agreements had 10% or more excess points and 20% of agreements had 25% or more 
excess points and 8% of agreements had 50% or more excess points.   
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Figure 4  Details of English AES over-subscriptions 
 
 
Some of the farmers’ motivations for this unsubsidised activity were identified during the 
face-to-face interviews with farmers.  Field margins, in particular, were often additional to 
the AES requirements but were being managed to the prescriptions included in the 
agreement due to the increased flexibility that this offered the farmers.  Having these 
additional margins provided the flexibility to change the location of the margins across 
the farm if necessary, or in the case of nectar/pollen strips acted as a back-up if another 
strip failed to establish properly.   
“We have a half acre pollen and nectar mix running down the side of the 
margin.  This is also in HLS. We have another one that is not in HLS and 
not paid for. We put that one in because you have to rotate them every 5 
years because the cover runs out of steam so you get a year without any 
cover on it because you have to plough it up, so I have two.   So if anyone 
comes round to inspect I have another one”. (medium sized, mixed, 
tenanted farm) 
The interviews also revealed that some larger farms, in particular, were managing an 
extra 10% on their margins as a risk management strategy to ensure compliance with 
the scheme prescriptions in order to protect their AES payment.  This additional 
unsubsidised activity also applied to regulatory requirements.  Wider cross-compliance 
strips were being left in order to protect their Single Payment Scheme payments, which 
were viewed as an important source of income.   
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Also, in situations where farmers had not renewed their AES agreement, some had 
retained AES prescriptions for certain features, particularly margins and field corners 
and consequently AES had led to a permanent change in behaviour. Some were 
‘between’ AES agreements, therefore, this management contributed only temporarily to 
unsubsidised environmental management.  
 
5. Discussion 
This paper has explored the patterns of uptake of subsidised and unsubsidised 
environmental activity at a national level in England. The results indicate that at the time 
of the survey the majority of environmental activity in terms of occurrence and scale on 
farms in England was subsidised, but around 25% of all environmental activity was 
unsubsidised, although as shown in Figure 1, often subsidised and unsubsidised 
activities take place alongside each other on the farm.  However, as we also reveal, the 
activities classed as ‘environmental’ may have been extrinsically motivated, rather 
implemented solely for environmental benefits.  This supports Darragh and Emery’s 
(2017) finding that definitions of what constitutes environmental behaviour on a farm  is 
complex.  
 
5.1 Understanding motivations and engagement strategies 
The paper sought to identify farmers’ motivations for undertaking unsubsidised 
environmental activities. The analysis provides insights into the extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivations for undertaking these activities, revealing that these are not discrete types 
but are heterogeneous and overlapping.  There are, however, clear differences in 
farmers’ motivations for undertaking subsidised and unsubsidised management 
activities. A complex mix of motivations influenced farmers to undertake subsidised 
activities within an AES, of which financial motivations dominated.  The environmental 
motivations were considerably less apparent and we would argue that to ensure durable 
and sustained environmental management, advice and engagement strategies need to 
shift the financial extrinsic motivations of farmers participating in AES to more intrinsic 
environmental motivations which are known to have greater permanence (Mills et al, 
2016). The activities most likely to be undertaken within an arable AES for 
environmental reasons were the wild bird/pollen and nectar mixes, possibly because the 
environmental benefits of such activities are clearly visible.   
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In contrast, there were clear environmental motivations for undertaking some of the 
unsubsidised activities; this was particularly the case for field corner management, buffer 
strips and wild bird/pollen/nectar mixes. Generally, the farmers surveyed understood the 
rationale for undertaking these unsubsidised activities for the benefit of the environment, 
clearly believing that their actions would benefit wildlife.  
The findings also revealed that whilst intrinsic motivations were important for 
undertaking unsubsidised activities, extrinsic motivations, particularly agronomic and 
financial ones, also influenced decisions.  One such activity already mentioned was the 
use of wild bird seed mixes for game shooting. Game shoots provide a financial income, 
although for many of the arable farmers in our study they were viewed as a cultural 
activity often used informally with friends and family. They were also considered 
environmentally beneficial for smaller wild birds.  This example, illustrates an interesting 
interplay between extrinsically-motivated actions and their overlap with intrinsically-
motivated cultural and environmental concerns An environmental activity mainly driven 
by agronomic motivations in the arable context was over-wintered stubbles, where 
cereal stubbles are left uncultivated and unsprayed after harvest for as long as possible.  
This practice can provide an important food source for seed-eating birds, whilst working 
well with spring cropping enabling a spreading of the workload and improving spring 
weed control. Other practices that might be undertaken for agronomic reasons, include 
grass margins, field corners, nectar and pollen strips for pollinators and cover crops 
which provide a habitat for many different species above ground, and also help improve 
the activity of microbes in the soil. 
Clearly, there is the potential to promote some unsubsidised environmental activities by 
highlighting the agronomic and financial benefits that resonate with farmers’ extrinsic 
motivations. Whilst there will often be a need for financial incentives for the more 
demanding environmental activities that impact on agricultural productivity, evidence 
from our study points to the potential to develop win-win scientific solutions and advice 
that can benefit both farming and the environment and therefore require no financial 
incentives.   
The data analysis also revealed some interesting interaction between subsidised and 
unsubsidised activity, with environmental features moving between the two. There was 
evidence that some environmental features continued to be managed positively for the 
environment once a subsidised AES contract had finished, although further research is 
required to understand the full extent to which this happens. Our interviews also 
provided some explanation for the AES over-subscription identified in terms of managing 
risk and contributing to farm management efficiency.  Whilst the scheme guidance 
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document did recommend delivering options slightly in excess of the target points, some 
of the oversubscription identified was considerable, going beyond expectations for 
normal risk management and would benefit from further exploratory research. 
5.2 Advice and Message framing 
The survey has clearly identified that many environmental activities are undertaken 
without subsidies, however, what is more questionable is the quality of the 
environmental management.  The ecological surveys conducted during the research 
(Removed for review, 2013), found that often those unsubsidised environmental areas, 
such as buffer strips, field margins and field corners were left unmanaged, with no active 
management to improve, or at least maintain, environmental quality. Farmers in the 
study often viewed the act of taking land out of production as sufficient for providing 
environmental benefits. However, for most environmental features active management is 
required.  For example pollen and nectar strips, require specific cutting regimes and 
even with best management practice need to be re-established after 3-4 years (Pywell et 
al, 2011). This finding highlights the value in providing guidance and advice to ensure 
unsubsidised features are managed to their optimum environmental potential. 
The CFE developed general guidelines setting out best practice for environmental 
management. However, the interview responses from farmers highlighted a reluctance 
to follow these guidelines for unsubsidised management activities, preferring to adapt 
practices to fit in with their farm management, such as allowing vehicular access on 
grass margins or flexible cutting times.  If a policy objective is to improve the quality of 
existing unsubsidised managed land, then alternative mechanisms, other than general 
guidelines are required to disseminate this information. Advice needs to be able to 
understand and cope with the heterogeneity in farmers’ motivations that engender 
unsubsidised environmental practices and to adapt and target messages depending on 
the farmers’ predisposition. To be able to develop this understanding and locate advice 
in its farm specific context requires some degree of personal engagement.  We would 
suggest that further research, particularly approaches involving action research and 
working closely with farmers in the co-production of knowledge and understanding, 
could help to clarify and test the most appropriate engagement messages and 
approaches required in different situations. 
Understanding the motivational pull for farmers to undertake unsubsidised 
environmental management practices can help with message framing in any advice or 
engagement strategy to encourage adoption of these practices.  As discussed earlier, 
message framing effects can vary depending on the farmer predispositions.  For those 
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farmers that respond to gain framing messages, highlighting the positives of activities, 
the win-win situations where practices appeal to agronomic and financial motivations by 
fitting in with the existing farming system and/or having financial advantages as well as 
benefiting the environment, can be effective. Particularly if environmental practices are 
promoted that are compatible with farmers’ cultural values. Such messaging can create 
new beliefs that environmental activities on farm can enhance production (Home, 2015).  
From our research findings, for example, the message might relate to field corner 
management and highlight the efficiency of taking awkward field corners out of 
production.  Furthermore, positive messages might, for example, highlight the positive 
impact of establishing wild bird mixes on increasing farmland bird numbers, rather than 
focusing on continued bird population decline through inaction. 
Others farmers, with more interdependent self-views, may respond better to loss framing 
messages with a personal or cultural connection, particularly those that instil fear if a 
particular environmentally beneficial behaviour is not performed, or evoke concern for a 
particular target species (Dickenson et al 2013). Examples from our research is the 
voluntary implementation of wider buffer zones alongside watercourses undertaken for 
fear of causing widespread water pollution from chemical spraying, or the introduction of 
skylark plots in recognition of the decline of this iconic farmland bird. This type of 
messaging requires an acceptance of responsibility by the farmer and perceived 
response efficacy.  
Fear messages promoting the possibility of regulation prompted some unsubsidised 
environmental action under the CFE initiative. The industry-led CFE was a response to 
the regulatory threat of compulsory set-aside (Powell et al., 2012). The motivation for 
action was to pre-empt additional regulatory burdens which may have brought 
additional, and uncertain, costs. Our findings also indicate that fear of incurring penalties 
led to additional unpaid activity within AES and cross-compliance 
Ultimately, to embed durable and sustainable environmental management in farmer 
behaviour requires an increase in farmers’ intrinsic motivations to undertake these 
activities.  However, as discussed elsewhere (Mills et al, 2016) this shift often requires a 
change in farmers’ underlying values and beliefs which are influenced over time by 
societal norms. To achieve this shift there is the need for a coherent policy and advice 
framework in which regulations and incentives are important elements for signalling 
societal norms and expectations, but in which advice and engagement are equally 
important in helping to understand farmers existing intrinsic and extrinsic motivations 
and encourage sustained behavioural change on the ground. 
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6 Conclusions 
As the environmental quality of agricultural land across Europe continues to decline 
there is an ever increasing need to find ways of encouraging environmentally beneficial 
farming practices. The policy response has been characterised by a mixture of three 
mechanisms; regulation, incentive schemes and voluntary/social approaches to re-join 
agricultural practice and beneficial environmental management. Whilst regulation and 
AES are part of the solution, there may emerge a need under the current neo-liberalised 
agenda to find ways to encourage farmers to undertake unsubsidised environmentally 
beneficial practices. This type of activity has greater potential to embed lasting beneficial 
environmental management in farmer behaviour than regulation and incentive schemes. 
From a policy perspective it is helpful to understand the motivations for existing 
unsubsidised activity as this can inform appropriate engagement strategies and 
message framing that will encourage uptake of more widespread voluntary 
environmental behaviour.  Our research has identified that around 25% of all 
environmental activity undertaken on arable farms in England is already unsubsidised. 
However, an in-depth examination of motivations for undertaking this activity reveals an 
interesting interplay between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations.  The evidence highlights 
that intrinsic environmental motives are important for delivering unsubsidised 
environmental practices on arable land, related to a personal interest in wildlife, although 
social concerns about pollution and reputational effects are also important and 
messages should therefore be framed accordingly. However, the evidence also clearly 
indicates that extrinsic motivations, particularly agronomic ones, are important for key 
unsubsidised environmental practices and therefore messages should be framed to 
highlight the potential agronomic benefits of environmental activities.  
Also, subsidised activity can be a trigger for more unsubsidised activity. Whist there is 
25% unsubsidised activity this often spills out from subsidised activities (especially 
relating to field margins). This is worthy of a little more critical reflection in the paper. 
Both because this intersection is interesting in itself and also it presents unsubsidised 
activities in a very different light.  Evidence that farmers receiving subsidies for 
environmental are doing extra without payment, which is worthy of more research.  
Finally, advice needs to be able to understand and cope with the heterogeneity in 
farmers’ motivations that engender unsubsidised environmental practices and to adapt 
and target messages depending on the farmers’ predisposition. However, to be able to 
develop this understanding and locate advice in its farm specific context requires some 
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degree of personal engagement, which is often lacking in the current policy instruments 
and engagement strategies used to support environmentally-beneficial land 
management practices.   
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